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NOTES
Recognizing the Nightmare: The Merger of Louisiana
State University and Southern University Law Schools
On July 19, 1989, a federal three judge panel of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ordered the con-
solidation of Louisiana's three boards of higher education and the merger
of Louisiana State University Law School and Southern University Law
School.' As justification for the decision to merge the two law schools,
the court emphasized the state's failure to follow its formerly approved
consent decree and the state's maintenance of a predominantly white
student body at Louisiana State University Law School. 2 The court
proposed that a merger of the schools was necessary to effectively
desegregate the law schools, thereby giving minority students equal op-
portunity to enjoy the quality state education provided by Louisiana
State University Law School.
However, by merging the faculties of the schools and by lowering
the academically stringent admissions standards at Louisiana State Uni-
versity, the court is, in effect, diluting the quality of legal education
that all future students will receive. Although the court expressed its
intent not to damage the quality of legal education offered at Louisiana
State University (L.S.U.),3 its implementation of the merger plan will
inevitably diminish the quality of the education offered and the students
attending the resulting school.
Because no constitutional justification exists for imposing a remedy
which will detrimentally affect every aspect of Louisiana's legal edu-
cational system, the federal district court order should not be imple-
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989). For a complete
statement of the facts, see Comment, Realizing the Dream: United States v. Louisiana,
50 La. L. Rev. 583 (1990).
2. Though both schools presently employ race-neutral admissions procedures, Louis-
iana State University Law School has a black population of 4%, while Southern University
Law School has a significantly greater proportion of black students (58%). Comment,
supra note 1, at 585.
3. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 519 (E.D. La. 1989). The court
stated that "it is not the intent of this Order to damage the quality of legal education
at the L.S.U. Law Center; to require significant lowering of admissions standards; or to
require any lowering of academic requirements for those students who do gain admission."
However, the court insisted upon new admissions requirements for the new school which
do not "disproportionately burden the black law student population." Id. at 514.
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mented. Since the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,4 federal
courts have had wide latitude to remedy Fourteenth Amendment viol-
ations by public educational systems. However, the discretion given the
courts in forming an appropriate remedy is subject to some limitations.
Though the Supreme Court has yet to reach a definitive conclusion as
to the appropriate constitutional analysis in evaluating the propriety of
the federal court's race conscious remedy, two tests are repeatedly ar-
ticulated. The Supreme Court has first applied a two-part test by which:
(1) the federal district court order must be supported by a compelling
governmental interest, and (2) the means chosen by the court are nar-
rowly tailored to accomplish the purpose of remedying past discrimi-
nation.' Some members of the Supreme Court have also suggested a
test of seemingly less scrutiny, requiring only that racial qualifications
designed to further remedial purposes must (1) serve important govern-
mental objectives and (2) be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives. 6
This paper will apply these tests used by the Supreme Court to the
recent United States v. Louisiana decision, in particular, the merger
order concerning L.S.U. and Southern law schools. The first section
addresses L.S.U. Law Center's potential liability for past discrimination
in higher education, and discusses the compelling governmental interest
in remedying past state discrimination along with the questionable ap-
plicability of Brown v. Board of Education8 to a situation involving
discrimination at the level of higher education. If Brown does not apply
to higher education, clearly the state is then under no affirmative ob-
ligation to repair any racial disparity in the law schools. If Brown is
in fact applicable to higher education, then L.S.U. Law Center is required
to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination.
The next step in the inquiry, discussed in Section II, is whether
L.S.U. Law Center has remedied the effects of prior discrimination by
adopting a racially neutral admissions procedure. Included in this section
is a discussion of the fundamental differences between higher education
and elementary and secondary education, which suggests a limited ap-
4. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
5. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847
(1986) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., with O'Connor, J., concurring);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2776 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
6. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301-02, 106 S. Ct. at 1861-62 (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519, 100 S. Ct. at 2796
(Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2783 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. 718 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989).
8. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
[Vol. 50
NOTES
plication of Brown's affirmative obligations to higher educational sys-
tems.
The third section evaluates the propriety of the proposed merger of
L.S.U. and Southern law schools and the imposition of a racial quota
in the resulting school while acknowledging the safeguards and limitations
placed on the district court's equity jurisdiction. Next, the territorial
scope of the remedy must be examined in light of these restrictions in
order to determine whether the district court may permissibly impose a
remedy which affects Southern University Law School in addition to
L.S.U. Law Center. Another limitation concerns the temporal scope of
the remedy, or the availability of continuing jurisdiction of the district
court over its order. The final issue discussed in Section III is whether
the court exceeded its equity jurisdiction by ordering an unwaivable
racial quota to be implemented in the merged law school. This subsection
traces the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize substantively similar
quotas in both education and employment contexts.
The final section proposes alternatives which would enhance the
goals asserted by the district court in ordering the merger. Adoption of
these alternatives would minimize the effects on Southern University
Law School and future law students.
COMPELLING, STATE INTEREST-APPLYING BROWN TO HIGHER
EDUCATION
The Compelling State Interest in Remedying Past Discrimination
Generally, local elementary and secondary school systems are re-
quired by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to take affirmative action to eliminate the vestiges of racial segregation
within their districts. When local school boards fail to eliminate verifiable
past discrimination, the district court may be justified in intervening
into the local system and formulating its own remedy based on what
the Court has termed a compelling state interest in providing equal
educational opportunities for all students. 9
Cases arising after Brown drew a distinction between de jure and
de facto segregation. De facto segregation is not caused by any action
of the state; therefore, a court-imposed remedy is unavailable. De jure
segregation requires some evidence of intent on behalf of the state to
provide different educational opportunities based on race. The Supreme
Court has held that the mere existence of racially identifiable elementary
and secondary schools within close proximity of one another is prima
9. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971).
19901
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facie evidence of de jure segregation. 10 This finding triggers the com-
pelling state interest necessary to justify dismantling the dual system of
education, which perpetuates the "separate but equal" standard con-
demned by Brown.
One issue left unresolved by the Supreme Court is the applicability
of Brown to higher education. In elementary and secondary education,
all children are required to attend school and the compelling interest in
education is unquestionable. While the state certainly has an interest in
educating as many of its citizens as fully as possible, it is not required
to provide free higher education to all of its citizens. To determine
which students should continue their education, colleges and graduate
schools have established admissions requirements to ensure that the
students who are admitted have a high chance of success. Because it is
not possible at this time to offer higher education to everyone, the state
has an interest in preserving its available schools for those who are
likely to succeed. Consequently, states and the courts have given colleges
broad discretion in formulating their admissions policies, based on the
colleges' experience and expertise in determining which individual qual-
ities predict success.
Thus, in higher education, as distinguished from the elementary and
secondary school context, the state has a competing interest in ensuring
that its resources are not wasted and that its citizens are properly
educated. Until states are required to offer free higher education to all
of their citizens, the interest in educating these citizens will be less
compelling than it is in the context of elementary and secondary schools.
Competing State Interests in Education
In the realm of higher education, courts have been faced with the
possibility of compelling governmental interests other than that of rem-
edying past discrimination. In Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,." the Supreme Court discussed many of the interests asserted by
the district court in formulating the merger remedy in United States v.
Louisiana. In Bakke,12 a white student challenged a medical school's
special admissions program which set aside a certain number of places
for minority students. The separate evaluation of minority students
precluded Bakke, an undisputably qualified applicant, from competing
with the less qualified minorities. Bakke claimed that this quota, op-
erating in favor of minority students, excluded him on the basis of race
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting
10. Id. at 18, 91 S. Ct. at 1277.
11. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
12. Id.
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racial discrimination by any program receiving federal financial assis-
tance. The Supreme Court held that the use of a racial classification
to deny qualified applicants a chance to compete for a select number
of seats was illegal, and ordered the school to admit Bakke.
In reaching its decision, the Court first recognized the compelling
governmental interest in attaining a heterogeneous student body." How-
ever, the Court in Bakke emphasized that this interest is not advanced
where a school mandates a "specified percentage of a particular group
merely because of its race or ethnic origin.' ' 4 In fact, the Court found
that focusing solely on racial diversity actually hinders the attainment
of diversity.' 5 The goal of serving a disadvantaged community also fails
the compelling interest requirement, noted the Court, where there is no
evidence that the graduating minorities will participate in that com-
munity, or that they will in fact graduate. 6
In United States v. Louisiana, the court recognized the interests
asserted in Bakke, stating that the reason it imposed an admissions
quota was to "increase the diversity of LSU Law Center and the number
of black graduates.' ' 7 The court focused on the low ratio of black
lawyers to the black population and the political and economic value
of a legal degree. 8 However, the court never demonstrated that these
interests were so compelling as to warrant court intervention into the
state system.
Even if these interests were recognized as compelling, the order does
not describe how merging the law schools would achieve these results.
First, although the court order established a minimum 10076 quota for
black admissions, it does not require those admitted to be Louisiana
residents. If those black students who met the lowered admissions re-
quirements were not state residents, there is no assurance that they will
remain within the state upon graduation in order to serve Louisiana's
black population.
Second, if the purpose of the merger is to give more minorities the
opportunity to obtain a legal education, the elimination of Southern
Law School is counterproductive to its purpose. Unless L.S.U. Law
Center significantly lowers its admissions standards as well as its present
attrition rate, and doubles its class size, fewer minorities will ever have
the chance to compete in the legal community. Under the present system,
those students who do not meet the admissions requirements of L.S.U.
and other comparable law schools retain the opportunity to obtain a
13. Id. at 311, 98 S. Ct. at 2759.
14. Id. at 307, 98 S. Ct. at 2757.
15. Id. at 315, 98 S. Ct. at 2761.
16. Id. at 310, 98 S. Ct. at 2759.
17. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 514 (E.D. La. 1989).
18. Id. at 513.
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legal education at Southern University Law School. While the quality
of education at Southern University is admittedly inferior to that at
L.S.U. Law Center,1 9 almost half of those students attending Southern
University Law School do pass the bar examination. Eliminating this
opportunity for all students, regardless of race, in favor of providing
an opportunity at L.S.U. Law Center for a small percentage of minority
students, severely undercuts any court rationale for imposing this remedy.
The court focuses upon the high quality education given at L.S.U. Law
Center without recognizing the inevitable dilution of quality resulting
from the merger of Southern University Law School's faculty and student
body.
Underlying the federal district court's rationale are two irreconcilable
assertions of compelling state interest. One is the previously mentioned
interest in efficiently allocating state resources, which supports the prop-
osition that not everyone is entitled to a legal education. Contrary to
this concern is the interest in educating more minority students or in
educating 'all citizens as fully as possible. The present system resolves
these competing interests by maintaining one law school with expansive
research facilities and high admission and graduation requirements, and
a separate law school with fewer resources and less stringent admissions
requirements. In this way, Louisiana offers a legal education to anyone
with the desire to succeed, without sacrificing its resources on those
least likely to succeed, as measured by undergraduate grade point av-
erages and the Law School Admission Test (L.S.A.T.) scores. Although
a merged law school would promote the interest in educating minority
students, it would be a much less efficient means of allocating the state's
resources than the present system. Because many of the state's more
qualified students would not attend the less selective merged law school,
the educational resources of the state would be used to educate a less
talented group of students. Such a school may be less expensive than
the current system; however, it is hardly an efficient allocation of
resources.
By changing the present system, the district court implies that,
although everyone is not entitled to a legal education, less qualified
blacks are more entitled to a legal education than less qualified whites,
who will consequently be deprived of any opportunity to obtain a legal
education. To accept this as a compelling state interest would be un-
conscionable, as equal educational opportunities should be available to
all students, regardless of race.
19. This conclusion is based upon the bar passage rate of L.S.U. law students as
compared to Southern law students. L.S.U. Law Center's bar passage rate has averaged
approximately 907o over the last five years, while Southern's bar passage rate is under
5007/. Id.
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While the state has a compelling interest in remedying past discrim-
ination, individual universities have a competing interest, guaranteed by
the First Amendment, in selecting students.
In Bakke, a university asserted its First Amendment right to impose
admission requirements in opposition to a white student's assertion of
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The University of
California argued that the First Amendment protected its decision to
establish a racial quota which effectively excluded some qualified white
students from admission in order to foster diversity in the school.
Addressing the limitations that the First Amendment imposes upon
review of university admission decisions, the Supreme Court remarked:
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated con-
stitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of
the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body. . . .Thus, in arguing that its universities must be
accorded the right to select those students who will contribute
the most to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes
a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amend-
ment.
20
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the medical school's voluntary racial
quota, in effect applied a balancing test by weighing the First Amendment
right of academic freedom against the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee
of equal protection. To assist in its balance of the competing rights,
the court examined the purpose for which the First Amendment right
was exercised (to attain diversity), and the extent, to which the school's
admissions policies met that purpose. Because the Court found that the
quota actually hindered the faculty's goal of attaining diversity, the First
Amendment deference given to the school in formulating its admissions
policies was reduced. Thus, the student's Fourteenth Amendment right
outweighed the university's First Amendment interest in academic free-
dom. However, if the medical school in Bakke had adopted an admis-
sions policy that served its purpose of attaining racial diversity (for
example, by imposing an admissions policy that did not focus solely
upon race), then the court might have upheld the university's First
Amendment right to academic freedom. Without a showing of discrim-
inatory intent, claims of racial discrimination in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment would be outweighed in a similar balancing test, in
favor of allowing the exercise of academic freedom.
Presently, L.S.U. Law Center has an admissions policy that is not
discriminatory, although the school has implemented an affirmative ac-
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13, 98 S. Ct. at 2759-60.
19901
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tion program designed to attract other race students who have displayed
the ability to succeed in law school. With the district court ordered
quota, not only would the school's right of academic freedom be hin-
dered, but white students' Fourteenth Amendment rights would be vi-
olated, much like the student in Bakke. If L.S.U. Law Center is presently
complying with Fourteenth Amendment-imposed limitations on admis-
sions requirements, then the balancing test relied on in Bakke would
favor preservation of the present admissions system, allowing L.S.U.
Law Center to exercise its First Amendment rights without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of potential white students.
ADOPTION OF RACIALLY NEUTRAL ADMISSIONS PROCEDURES
The Supreme Court has not firmly concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment and equal protection duties articulated in Brown and sub-
sequent cases apply with equal force to college and graduate level fa-
cilities. A few courts have recognized the duty to dismantle dual higher
education systems, especially when, as is the case with L.S.U. and
Southern law schools, the separate schools were initially established as
single-race institutions. 2' However, because the nature and composition
of colleges and graduate schools are fundamentally different from that
of elementary and secondary schools, the application of similar remedies
for all levels of education is impossible. 22 Thus, even if Brown does
apply to higher education, the remedies imposed by the court must take
into account these differences.
One difference is the varying level of state interest in higher education
and in elementary and secondary education. Another distinction between
elementary and secondary education and higher education is the maturity
level of the students. Older students are typically more accepting of
others who come from different cultural backgrounds. Furthermore,
while parents generally choose which school a young child will attend,
an older student will traditionally bear the responsibility of choosing
for himself. In higher education, the individual right of choice is even
more valuable because the individual must weigh his own choices and
decide which aspects of a school are most important to him.
21. Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1986) (Geier II); United States
v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ala. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1532
(11th Cir. 1987); Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1065 (6th Cir.) (Geier 1),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979); United States v. Louisiana, 692 F.
Supp. 642, 653 (E.D. La. 1988); Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987),
rev'd, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990).
22. For a discussion of the differing state interests in college and graduate schools
and in elementary and secondary schools, see supra text at p. 560-61 and infra text at
p. 565-68.
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Proponents of the merger argue that the reason some blacks, al-
though qualified to attend L.S.U., may instead choose to attend Southern
University Law School is that they feel intimidated by the prospect of
being a minority student in a predominantly white school, or because
they perceive Southern as a racially identifiable school, even though its
law school is desegregated. 23 Those who choose Southern University Law
School over L.S.U. for these reasons have chosen to place their freedom
of association above their right to obtain a higher quality education. If
the purpose of Brown and its progeny was to allow blacks equal access
to all schools, then this purpose is best served by open admissions in
higher education. It should not be the role or duty of the district court
to equalize all factors in the individual's decision-making process involved
in choosing a school.
In Alabama State Teachers Association (ASTA) v. Alabama Public
School and College Authority,24 the court noted that the primary dif-
ference between higher education and elementary and secondary edu-
cation is the fact that higher education is neither free nor involuntary.
Students are free to choose which school they will attend, or whether
to pursue higher education at all, by considering certain factors such
as the cost of a particular school, its location, available facilities, and
admissions requirements. In addition, freedom to choose where to attend
college "has a long tradition and helps to perform an important function,
viz., fitting the right school to the right student. '2 5 In elementary and
secondary schools, on the other hand, freedom of choice is not greatly
impaired by student assignment because, "in principle at least, one school
for a given grade level is substantially similar to another in terms of
goals, facilities, course offerings, teacher training and salaries, and so
forth." 26 Thus, the court in ASTA held that a freedom of choice plan
in higher education, in the absence of discriminatory admissions pro-
cedures, satisfies the state's duty to desegregate.
23. See Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990). In Ayers, the court noted
that although black students may have freedom to choose which school to attend, their
choices are not made in a vacuum. Because blacks' perceptions and choices are distorted
by vestiges of de jure segregation, the court reasoned, their choices are not really "free."
In addition, the statistics determining how many black students presently attending Southern
University Law School who would have been admitted to L.S.U. Law Center (had they
applied) are unavailable. For purposes of argument, it is assumed that some minority
students at Southern do meet the admissions requirements of L.S.U.
Note: The Ayers decision is scheduled for rehearing en banc in June, 1990 by the 5th
Circuit.
24. 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam without
written opinion, 393 U.S. 400, 89 S. Ct. 681 (1969).
25. 289 F. Supp. at 790.
26. Id. at 788.
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Adoption of a racially neutral admissions policy would seem to
preclude the element of intent necessary to show de jure segregation,
thus precluding judicial intervention into desegregation efforts. Some
courts, however, have held that this action is insufficient in encouraging
other-race students to enroll in predominantly one-race schools. 27 In
United States v. Louisiana, the federal district court recognized that the
present admissions policies at both L.S.U. and Southern law schools
"no longer discriminate on the basis of race or otherwise. ' ' 28 The court
noted, however, that mere adoption of neutral admissions policies did
not fulfill the duty to integrate higher education. 29
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of a racially neutral
admissions policy in the context of higher education, but has held it to
be an inadequate means of integrating segregated schools in the context
of public elementary and secondary education. In Green v. School Board
of New Kent County,30 the Court held that implementation of a program
where students were allowed to choose which public school to attend
was inadequate and that the public schools were required to take more
affirmative action to integrate their student bodies.3' The Court further
noted that other constitutional remedies, such as rezoning, were more
suited to foster integration.3 2
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recently held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires no more than the adoption of racially
neutral admissions policies in order to achieve integration. In Bazemore
v. Friday,33 the Court found that the continued existence of single race
4-H clubs did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment where admission
to the clubs was open to everyone regardless of race, even though the
club had a past policy of racial segregation. Bazemore is distinguishable
from Green by the fact that the decision to join a club is completely
voluntary, whereas the decision to attend elementary and secondary
school is not. In making this distinction, the Court stated that:
While school children must go to school, there is no compulsion
to join 4-H or Homemaker Clubs, and while School Boards
customarily have the power to create school attendance areas
and otherwise desegregate the school that particular students
may attend, there is no statutory or regulatory authority to deny
a young person the right to join any Club he or she wishes to
27. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990); Geier 1, 597 F.2d at 804.
28. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 644.
29. Id. at 655-56.
30. 391 U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689 (1968).
31. Id. at 440, 88 S. Ct. at 1695.
32. Id. at 442, 88 S. Ct. at 1696.
33. 478 U.S. 385, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
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join.... And however sound Green may have been in the
context of the public schools, it has no application to this wholly
different milieu.3 4
Thus, it seems that Green is only applicable in the context of public
elementary and secondary education. Where attendance is not compulsory
and where there is no customary state authority to regulate patterns of
attendance, as in higher education, Bazemore, and not Green, should
be the controlling authority.
Nevertheless, district courts differ in their application of Green and
Bazemore to higher education. In Ayers v. Allain (Ayers 1),35 the court
held that at a minimum, for higher education, the state has a duty to
adopt and implement good faith, racially nondiscriminatory policies and
practices. The court extensively discussed the principles articulated in
Green, ASTA, and Bazemore and concluded that these cases:
stand in harmony ... for the proposition that the scope of the
affirmative duty to disestablish a former de jure segregated
system of education is to be defined in accordance with the
degree of choice individuals enjoy as to whether they wish to
attend college at all and, if so, which one.3 6
In the realm of higher education, the special emphasis placed on the
uniqueness of each school renders the right to choose essential.
The court in United States v. Louisiana disagreed with Ayers I,
stating that Bazemore is inapplicable to higher education because there
is no comparison between the value of being a member of a 4-H Club
and the value of an advanced education.37 The court, however, misses
the point of Bazemore. The distinction is based on choice, not the value
of education. The court attempts to avoid this argument by remarking
that free choice is not an issue where the facilities of L.S.U. and Southern
are unequal. However, the concept of free choice includes a choice
among facilities. The adoption of racially neutral admissions policies
allows otherwise qualified students to consider tuition costs, resources,
and other factors in deciding which school to attend. By eliminating
one school, the court attempts to assist students in their decision-making
process; however, there is no assurance that these students will choose
to attend the resulting law school. If the quality education now offered
by L.S.U. Law Center will be detrimentally affected by the admission
of less qualified students, it is foreseeable that those qualified students
presently attending L.S.U. Law Center or who will consider attending
34. Id. at 408, 106 S. Ct. at 3013.
35. 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987), rev'd, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990).
36. 674 F. Supp. at 1553.
37. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 656 (E.D. La. 1988).
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L.S.U. in the future may choose to attend a more competitive out-of-
state school.3"
The issue of whether Bazemore applies to higher education reap-
peared on appeal in Ayers v. Allain (Ayers I!)."9 In Ayers II, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court and held that the state has an affir-
mative duty to eliminate all vestiges of de jure segregation, a duty that
goes beyond mere implementation of racially neutral admissions policies.
However, the court disagreed with the interpretation adopted by the
court in United States v. Louisiana,4° stating that to argue "that a state's
duty to eradicate the effects of de jure segregation depends on the
importance that the public places on a particular activity . . . would
require this court to create a hierarchy of values at odds with the moral
choices inherent in the forerunners of Green."'4 Instead, the court
distinguished Bazemore on grounds that while the holding in Bazemore
rested on the absence of evidence of discrimination, "the record in the
present case is replete with the disease." '42
The dissenting opinion in Ayers II refused to distinguish Bazemore
on an evidentiary basis, arguing that the role of an appeals court is
limited by the express decision by the Supreme Court to refuse to extend
Green to cases involving freedom of choice in contexts other than
elementary and secondary education. To distinguish Bazemore from
Ayers I on this basis "merely puts the evidence ahead of the standard, '43
which, according to Bazemore, is freedom of choice.
PROPRIETY OF MERGER AND QUOTA SYSTEM-IS THE REMEDY
NARROWLY TAILORED?
District Court's Equity Jurisdiction
Once a Fourteenth Amendment right and a violation of that right
have been established, "a district court is controlled by general principles
38. In Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.) (Geier 1), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979), the court approved a plaintiff-proposed merger of
two universities. As a result of the merger, the merged institution lost significant enrollment,
including losses in total enrollment and losses in both black and white enrollment. Total
enrollment over a ten year period declined 36.8%, in contrast to a 6.9% decline in
statewide public university enrollment. See Motion and Memorandum of Board of Regents'
on Summary Judgment, Appendix C: Record Excerpts, Joint Appendix to Jurisdictional
Statement at 449a, United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989).
39. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990).
40. See supra text accompanying note 33.
41. Ayers II, 893 F.2d at 745.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 757.
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of equity in fashioning a desegregation remedy."" Even if a Fourteenth
Amendment violation were shown by Louisiana's maintenance of two
law schools, the federal district court may have exceeded this equity
jurisdiction in its formulation of a remedy.
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11)
described equity as traditionally "characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs." '45 The Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken 11)46 required the district court to focus upon three factors in
formulating a remedy. First, the desegregation remedy must be related
to "the condition alleged to offend the Constitution.1 47 Next, the order
must remedy the effects of identified past discrimination for the purpose
of restoring "the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. '4 Finally, the
federal courts must consider the "interests of state and local authorities
in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. ' 49 Thus,
while the district court's power to formulate a remedy is broad, it must
balance individual and collective interests. 0 As the Court in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education warned, "it must be rec-
ognized that there are limits" beyond which a court may not go.5
When the district court, or another state actor, advocates a racial
classification as a remedy for alleged prior equal protection violations,
it must show that, along with a compelling interest, the remedy is
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired end.12 The examination of a
"narrowly tailored" remedy includes a review of its (1) territorial scope,
(2) temporal scope, and (3) substantive scope. In this case, the territorial
scope of the remedy refers to the question of whether Southern, which
is arguably desegregated, may be affected by the ordered merger. The
temporal scope of the remedy refers to the continuing jurisdiction of
the court in implementing the order and evaluating its success. The
substantive scope of the remedy refers to the propriety of a racial quota
in attempting to integrate the resulting school. The following sections
detail the analysis of these factors.
44. Geier 1, 597 F.2d at 1068.
45. 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S. Ct. 753, 756 (1955) (Brown 1).
46. 433 U.S. 267, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977).
47. Id. at 280, 97 S. Ct. at 2757 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738,
94 S. Ct. 3112, 3128 (1974) (Milliken 1)).
48. Id. at 281, 97 S. Ct. at 2757 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746, 94 S. Ct. at
3128).
49. Id.
50. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16, 91 S. Ct.
1267, 1276 (1971).
51. Id. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 1282.
52. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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Territorial Scope of the Remedy
L.S.U. has a low percentage of minority student enrollment, and
efforts in the last two years to increase minority enrollment have been
unsuccessful. Although L.S.U. Law Center has implemented an affir-
mative action program designed to attract minority students, many stu-
dents admitted through this program do not earn passing grades. 3
L.S.U.'s failure to attract quality minority students may be attributed
to the fact that qualified minority students from Louisiana and other
states have been lured to other institutions by substantial scholarship
offerings.
Southern, which lacks stringent admissions standards and high at-
trition rates, "is desegregated, with a student body 58 percent black
and 42 percent white and a faculty (including part-time) which is virtually
50/50.' '1 4 One question arising out of the district court order in United
States v. Louisiana is whether, by a merger of the two schools, the
court has detrimentally affected Southern University Law School, as it
is admittedly not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If Southern University Law School is eliminated
as a separate entity, there is a possibility that it will lose its identity
and reputation along with substantial alumni support. If the nature and
extent of the violation must determine the scope of the remedy, then
by including Southern in the plan to desegregate L.S.U., the court may
have exceeded its authority.
Even in the context of elementary and secondary schools, the Su-
preme Court has imposed constraints upon a district court's equity
jurisdiction. For instance, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1),5 a federal
district court attempted to impose a multi-district remedy for a finding
of single-district segregation. In Milliken I, after a finding of illegal
segregation in Detroit public schools, the district court approved a
desegregation plan which encompassed Detroit and fifty-three outlying
school districts. The court claimed its plan was necessary to achieve
desegregation within the city schools as it would discourage "white
flight" to the suburbs, which would also be subject to the plan. The
Supreme Court found that the devised remedy greatly exceeded the
territorial bounds of the violation and reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, which eventually led to a new desegregation plan. Following
the language in Swann concerning the permissible scope of remedies,
the Court first noted the difficulties in allowing the district court to,
53. See Comment, supra note 1, at 607 for a comparison of the percentage of
freshman minority students with the percentage of total minority enrollment.
54. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 513 (E.D. La. 1989).
55. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
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in effect, consolidate the various independent school districts into one
unit, stating:
It is obvious from the scope of the interdistrict remedy itself
that absent a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan
relating to school districts the District Court will become first,
a de facto "legislative authority" to resolve these complex ques-
tions, and then the "school superintendent" for the entire area.
This is a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to per-
form .56
The Court in Milliken recognized that an interdistrict remedy might
be appropriate in some circumstances, but only if it were shown that
a constitutional violation within one district significantly affected seg-
regation in another district, or where all included districts were engaging
in unconstitutional segregation.17 Because the pleadings did not refer to
any violations in outlying districts in this case, it was inappropriate for
the court to consider these districts in formulating a remedy without
going "beyond the original theory of the case as framed by the
pleadings." '5 8 The Court emphasized the impropriety of the remedy and
stated that "[t]o approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose
on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional
violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted
at in Brown I and Brown II or any holding of this Court."5 9
The Court also noted the crucial fact that none of the parties had
considered, nor advocated, an interdistrict remedy at the time of trial. 60
Thus, where the pleadings do not evidence a violation on behalf of a
particular area and where the parties do not suggest that the remedy
should encompass this area, the district court does not have the authority
to include it within its desegregation plan.
There is no indication in the opinion in United States v. Louisiana6 l
that there was ever any discussion of the possibility of a constitutional
violation by Southern University Law School. In discussing the issue of
liability, the court ignored the percentage of black and white students
attending Southern University Law School 2.6 In effect, the court infers
state-wide liability based on the existence of a predominantly white
school, L.S.U., within close proximity of Southern. However, the court
has never established that there is a disproportionate number of black
56. Id. at 743-44, 94 S. Ct. at 3126-27.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 752, 94 S. Ct. at 3131.
61. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1988).
62. Approximately 580 black, 42% white.
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
students presently attending Southern who are qualified to attend L.S.U.
under its present admissions program or who were excluded from L.S.U.
solely because of their race. The Supreme Court has previously admitted
that the existence of a predominantly one-race school, in itself, is not
evidence that a school system still practices segregation by law.
63
In the context of elementary and secondary education, courts rec-
ognize that changes in migratory patterns and other factors may change
the racial balances within public schools. 64 Thus, predominantly one-
race schools may come into being without state involvement. The ar-
gument that a predominately white law school, such as L.S.U., could
exist in the absence of state involvement is even more compelling in
light of the voluntary choice of schools given to students and the
admissions requirements at both schools. There is no factual basis for
claiming that state maintenance of L.S.U. as a predominantly one-race
school has significantly affected the percentage of other-race enrollment
at Southern Law School, as required under Milliken I to impose a
remedy upon a desegregated school.
Although the parties to an action do not have total control in
formulating a remedy to suit their desires, the Court rarely deviates
from the remedies suggested by the parties. In the only case approving
a merger of higher institutions, all plaintiffs advocated merger of the
two schools. 6' In contrast, as in Milliken, none of the parties in United
States v. Louisiana contemplated a merger of the law schools. Even the
special master appointed by the federal district court expressly rejected
the idea, stating that "merger would involve vastly different institutional
goals and faculty outlooks, as well as levels of student achievement,
and it should not be resorted to unless other approaches fail." 66 In
considering whether other approaches had failed, the district court based
its evaluation of the success of L.S.U.'s desegregation efforts solely on
the total percentage of black students attending L.S.U., ignoring the
recent recruiting efforts and percentages of freshman admissions (7%
in 1989).67 Allowing the district court to formulate an order which exceeds
the territorial scope of the violation and which exceeds the scope sug-
gested by the plaintiffs is clearly undesirable as it gives the district court
63. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26, 91 S. Ct. 1267,
1281 (1971).
64. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436, 96 S. Ct. 2697,
2704 (1976).
65. Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1077 (6th Cir.) (Geier 1), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 846, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979).
66. Report of the Special Master's Final Report, Appendix C: Record Excerpts, Joint
Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement, at 691a-92a, United States v. Louisiana, 718
F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989).
67. See Comment, supra note 1, at 607.
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the unlimited discretion to impose devastating remedies upon innocent
parties.
Temporal Scope of the Remedy- Continuing Jurisdiction
The federal district court in United States v. Louisiana expressed
the intention to retain jurisdiction over the merger to ensure that its
goals were enacted. One goal is to admit and graduate equal numbers
of black and white students. To retain jurisdiction in this manner is a
further violation of the court's equity jurisdiction, as it would require
the court to police percentages on a year-to-year basis.
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,68 the lower court
retained jurisdiction over a desegregation plan which required annual
adjustment of attendance zones to maintain a racial balance within the
public schools. The Supreme Court held that by retaining authority to
adjust attendance zones, the court had exceeded its jurisdiction. Once
a district court has implemented a racially neutral plan to remedy the
defendants' constitutional violations, it has fully performed its function. 69
The Supreme Court viewed the desegregation plan, which required a
particular degree of racial balance or mixing, to be an inflexible re-
quirement to be applied anew each year, in direct violation of the
principles articulated in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation.10 Because the purpose of equity jurisdiction is to remedy con-
stitutional violations, once the initial violation has been remedied the
district court may not interfere without a showing of further segregative
actions.71
Thus, even if the federal district court has jurisdiction to implement
the merger of the two schools, it has no authority to retain jurisdiction
in order to maintain a certain racial balance within the newly formed
school. If the desegregation plan at the merged law center failed because
those minorities admitted could not meet that school's standards of
performance, the federal district court could not intervene. Unless the
district court could identify intentional discrimination on the merged law
school's behalf, it is precluded from retailoring its plan to ensure equal
percentages of graduating white and black students, or even to ensure
that any minority students graduate. The Court in Pasadena recognized
that, at some point, a school system has performed its duty to achieve
desegregation. Many factors over which the schools and the courts have
no control affect the percentages of minority attendance. To allow the
court to annually reconstruct its plan to minimize these factors is to
68. Id.
69. Id. at 437, 96 S. Ct. at 2705.
70. Id. at 433, 96 S. Ct. at 2703.
71. Id.
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ignore the purpose of desegregation plans, which is to remedy intentional
segregation.
Substantive Scope of the Remedy-The Propriety of a Race
Conscious Remedy
As part of its efforts to desegregate the merged law school, the
district court imposed on the merged law school a ten percent admissions
set-aside for minority students, without regard to their qualifications."
The propriety of a mandatory racial quota has not been addressed by
the Supreme Court in the context of higher education since the decision
in Regents of University of California v. Bakke. 3 However, the Court
has addressed the use of quotas in other contexts, particularly in the
context of employment. An analysis of the former cases concerning
educational quotas and the resulting developments in employment quotas
reveals that it is unlikely that the district court order will survive Supreme
Court scrutiny.
In Bakke the Court noted that "[riacial and ethnic distinctions of
any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
judicial examination. ' 74 Even though the racial qualification in that case
operated in favor of minorities, whom the Fourteenth Amendment was
originally designed to protect, the Court stressed that "[tlhe guarantee
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both
are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal." 75
Next, the Court discussed the limited scope of the remedies affirmed
in the context of elementary and secondary education; the Court ap-
proved such remedies only where a constitutional violation was proven,
where the injury to innocent parties was minimal, and where the program
would achieve the desired result. None of those factors were met by
the California Board of Regents' adopting racial quotas for medical
school admissions. First, there was no showing of prior identified dis-
crimination. Second, otherwise qualified parties were totally foreclosed
from competing for the special admissions seats. The court noted that
this was critically different from elementary and secondary education,
where permitted race conscious remedies did not deny any student equal
opportunity to receive an education. Finally, there was no showing that
giving lesser qualified minorities the opportunity to earn a medical
education would significantly affect the number of graduating and prac-
ticing minority physicians.
72. See Comment, supra note 1.
73. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
74. Id. at 291, 98 S. Ct. at 2748.
75. Id. at 289-90, 98 S. Ct. at 2748.
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The Court further noted that while a goal of attaining a diverse
student body is essential, ethnic diversity "is only one element in a
range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal
of a heterogeneous student body." ' 76 To focus solely on ethnic diversity
is impermissible because it precludes other qualified applicants from
competing for available seats even though they may possess otherwise
diverse backgrounds. Thus, while race may be one consideration in the
selection process, it may not be the sole consideration. 77
Since Bakke, the Supreme Court has considered the use of racial
quotas only in the context of employment discrimination." However,
recent employment discrimination cases illustrate that the application of
the Bakke restrictions on the implementation of quotas apply with equal
force to quotas ordered by district courts.
In United States v. Paradise,79 the Supreme Court synthesized its
previous year's decisions regarding employment quotas, and suggested
some guidelines for determining when a racial quota is permissible to
eradicate prior identified discrimination by a state actor.
Paradise involved a district court's imposition of a fifty percent
promotions quota for qualified black state troopers in the Alabama
Department of Public Safety. In evaluating this quota, the Court initially
noted that although racial classifications may under limited circumstances
be used to remedy past discrimination, these classifications are reviewed
under a high level of scrutiny. The Court refrained from choosing either
analysis formerly proposed by its factions, 0 stating that in this case,
the mandatory racial classification passed even the "narrowly tailored"
test.
The Court articulated several factors which should be used to de-
termine whether race conscious remedies are appropriate:
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies;
(ii) the planned duration of the remedy;
(iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers
to be employed and the percentage of minority group members
in the relevant population or work force;
(iv) the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could
76. Id. at 314, 98 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
77. Id. at 315, 98 S. Ct. at 2761.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOE, 478 U.S. 421, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
79. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053.
80. Narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest or substantially related to
an important state objective. See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 6.
19901
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
not be met; and
(v) the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties.8 '
Applying these factors to the promotional quota, the Court found that,
in this instance, the use of a racial quota was appropriate to remedy
identified discrimination.12
Probably the most significant reason for upholding the quota in
Paradise was the existence of a waiver provision in the district court
order. If the Department of Public Safety could not find any qualified
black candidates, the fifty percent promotional requirement was waived
until qualified candidates applied. Thus, the Department could permis-
sively promote only white troopers to upper level positions when no
black troopers met the qualifications for those positions.
Even when black candidates were available, they were still required
to compete for the jobs with qualified white candidates. The Court
admitted that the blacks would receive some advantage from the quota
system, but emphasized that promotion of black candidates did not
deprive white candidates of the opportunity to be promoted. Because
the quota was only in effect until an acceptable nondiscriminatory pro-
motion plan could be developed or until blacks constituted twenty-five
percent of ranking officers, white candidates would soon have a second
opportunity for promotion.
Though Paradise only discussed quotas in the context of employment
promotions, similar concerns arise in the context of education. Thus,
the five factors articulated by the Court in Paradise may be applied by
analogy to United States v. Louisiana if a Fourteenth Amendment
violation has in fact occurred. The district court order in United States
v. Louisiana imposing a ten percent set-aside for minority students
cannot, however, meet the scrutiny of the Paradise test.
First, the court in United States v. Louisiana did not consider
alternative remedies. None of the parties advocated a quota system, and
the court never determined that the remedies suggested by the parties
would be ineffective. Second, the district court did not limit the time
period of the quota, nor condition its existence upon the adoption of
a more effective alternative. In fact, if the admissions quota does not
result in admission and graduation of the proposed percentage of mi-
norities, the district court has reserved the power to impose more strin-
gent requirements upon the school. Third, the district court never showed
that the ten percent figure had any relation to the percentage of qualified
minority students in Louisiana. Fourth, the quota requirements are not
81. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187, 107 S. Ct. at 1075.
82. The practical effect of this remedy was to encourage the Department of Public
Safety to develop a nondiscriminatory test to assure promotion of qualified blacks, though
validation of a new test was not necessary to suspend the quota requirement.
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conditioned upon the finding of qualified applicants to fill the set-aside
seats. Qualifications of the minority applicants will be irrelevant. Even
if the top minority applicant has lower objective test scores than all
white applicants, he must be admitted. This weighs heavily against the
fifth factor, that innocent third parties should not be affected, as less
qualified minorities will necessarily displace more qualified white stu-
dents.8" While the quota in Paradise merely delayed promotion of qual-
ified whites when equally qualified blacks were available to fill the
positions, the admissions quota ordered by the district court in United
States v. Louisiana effectively prevents qualified whites from obtaining
a legal education in favor of admitting less qualified minorities. Thus,
if the Supreme Court applies the test articulated in Paradise to a quota
system designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination in education,
the district court order would fail all five factors.
The most recent Supreme Court decision involving a racial quota
in the context of employment, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,8 4
reinforces the level of scrutiny articulated in Paradise. In City of Rich-
mond, the Court reviewed a quota established by the city requiring
prime contractors of city construction projects to subcontract at least
30% of the dollar amount of each contract to minority businesses. The
city justified its plan based on its own findings of past discrimination
in the construction industry. Though the Court refused to adopt a
uniform standard for the level of scrutiny to be applied to race-conscious
remedies, it emphasized its former view that the "standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
burdened or benefited by a particular classification." 5 The Court found
that a heightened standard of review was particularly necessary in this
case, where blacks comprised a majority of the City Council (who
imposed the quota), and where there was no finding of a statutory or
constitutional violation by anyone in the construction industry. Thus,
the Court required the city to show (1) there exists "a strong basis in
evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary," ' s6 and
(2) that the plan was tailored narrowly to remedy identified past dis-
crimination.
To determine past discrimination in the construction industry, the
Court required something more than a mere showing of a statistical
disparity between the number of contracts awarded to minority con-
83. This could be resolved by the implementation of substantial recruiting of minority
students, which is also a requirement under the district court order. However, if qualified
minority students were persuaded to attend L.S.U. by recruiting efforts and scholarships,
a quota would be unnecessary.
84. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
85. Id. at 721.
86. Id. at 730 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 106
S. Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986)).
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struction firms and the minority population of the city. While noting
that in some contexts a gross statistical disparity alone may constitute
prima facie evidence of discrimination, the Court distinguished these
situations from instances where qualifications were a prerequisite for
employment, stating that "where special qualifications are necessary, the
relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory
exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the
particular task." '8 7 This significantly increases the burden of proof re-
quired to show discrimination, as the city must determine the number
of minority firms qualified to perform subcontracting work and then
show that this number is disproportionate in relation to the number of
contracts actually awarded to minority firms. Without a showing that
qualified minority contractors were passed over in favor of other white
contractors, the city could not impose an arbitrary quota percentage.
In holding that there was no identifiable past discrimination in the
construction industry, the Court stated that the effect of-past societal
discrimination alone was not in itself justification for imposing racial
quotas. The Court then drew an analogy between quotas in higher
education (as discussed in Bakke) and quotas imposed upon industry,
suggesting that:
[like the claim that discrimination in primary and secondary
schooling justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school
admissions, an amorphous claim that there has been past dis-
crimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an
unyielding racial quota.
It is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would
be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination, just as it
was sheer speculation how many minority medical students would
have been admitted to the medical school at Davis absent past
discrimination in educational opportunities. 8
Thus, there is no compelling or substantial governmental interest in
establishing a quota system where there is no showing of identifiable
discrimination based on a statistical comparison between qualified mi-
norities and contracts awarded to minority firms. Because the city could
not show that a certain percentage of qualified minority firms were
affected by discrimination, any remedy imposing a certain percentage
could not meet a "narrowly tailored" standard of review.
Although City of Richmond involved a voluntarily imposed quota,
the same burdens of proof should apply to a court imposed quota based
upon a finding of prior discrimination. After City of Richmond, race
87. Id. at 725.
88. Id. at 724.
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conscious remedies may be appropriate only when there has been a
judicial determination of deliberate exclusion of qualified minorities.
However, L.S.U. Law Center's liability for past discrimination was based
upon mere statistical disparities, not upon intentional acts performed by
the law center; because L.S.U. law students must meet basic qualifi-
cations for admission, a statistical disparity alone should not give rise
to an inference of discrimination.
In United States v. Louisiana, the district court's method for de-
termining the 1007o set-aside figure was to compare the number of black
law students and black lawyers to the black community at large, without
regard to the percentage of minorities who would be qualified to attend
law school. The court tried to avoid a determination of the number of
blacks presently qualified by alluding to past discrimination in elementary
and secondary schools. Under the strict requirements of City of Rich-
mond to justify an unyielding racial quota for law school admissions,
the district court is required to: (1) identify the number of Louisiana
blacks presently qualified to attend law school; (2) show that this number
is disproportionate in relation to the number of blacks presently attending
L.S.U. Law Center; and (3) show that qualified whites were admitted
to L.S.U. Law Center over qualified black applicants.
Although the definition of "qualified" remains ambiguous, the dis-
trict court could not identify a single instance in which L.S.U. Law
Center admitted a white student over an equally qualified black student.
A strictly enforced racial quota is therefore unnecessary to coerce the
law school into admitting a certain percentage of black students.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE MERGER AND QUOTA PROVISIONS
The stated purpose of the federal district court order is to remedy
alleged past discrimination by the state of Louisiana, with the expected
results of achieving diversity in the classroom and increasing the number
of black attorneys in Louisiana. While the Supreme Court has recognized
the power given to the courts to remedy findings of identifiable dis-
crimination, it nevertheless requires that the federal district court use
the least intrusive means possible to achieve its purposes. Several alter-
native plans exist that would achieve the court's goals without detri-
mentally affecting innocent parties. This final section details a few of
these alternatives.
Increased Recruiting Efforts
This alternative would require L.S.U. Law Center to increase its
present recruiting efforts in an attempt to attract more minority students.
Although L.S.U. presently provides partial and full tuition scholarships
to minority students, the amount of these scholarships pales in com-
parison to those offered at more prestigious schools. Increasing schol-
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arship amounts is the first step in developing a more successful recruiting
program.
L.S.U. should also actively seek qualified blacks who, after admis-
sion, will be able to meet the requirements necessary to eventually
graduate from the school. L.S.U. Law Center presently conducts summer
workshops for minority students in order to improve their chance of
success. Unfortunately, this program has not been successful in putting
black students enrolled in the affirmative action program on equal
footing with the rest of the student body. Further study and development
of new remedial programs might increase the success rate of students
admitted through the affirmative action program.
New Admissions Procedures
In conjunction with recruiting efforts, L.S.U. Law Center should
develop an admissions procedure which focuses on attracting a diverse
student body. While this program should not be implemented solely for
the purpose of admitting a certain percentage of black students, race
would be considered, among other factors, in order to maintain a diverse
student body. The possibility that a student is a victim of past discrim-
ination in elementary or secondary school could be taken into account
in the enrollment decision. Thus, if a student does not possess the
requisite grade point average or L.S.A.T. score for admission into the
school, the admissions' office may consider the possibility of the student's
educational disadvantage and allow him admission. If the student pos-
sesses other characteristics which indicate potential success in law school,
his grade point average should be accorded less weight.
Implementation of this admissions procedure would effectively achieve
racial and cultural diversity, without imposing an unyielding and po-
tentially unconstitutional racial quota. One advantage of this system is
that the school would not be required to admit students who fail to
demonstrate potential to succeed in law school, and who might hinder
other students in the classroom. In addition, this procedure would make
concessions for white or other non-black students who are financially
or culturally disadvantaged, and will not discriminate against them based
solely on race.
New Location for L.S.U. or Southern Law School
Proponents of the merger suggest that minorities desiring to attend
law school in Louisiana are pressured by their peers into attending
Southern University Law School. Because Southern University Law School
was initially established as a school for black students, its location in
close proximity to L.S.U. Law Center has been viewed as an impediment
to minority recruiting efforts at L.S.U. Relocating Southern University
Law School or L.S.U. Law Center to another Louisiana city might
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eliminate the remnants of the dual system initially established in Baton
Rouge. This plan may also assist in defeating the unsubstantiated sup-
position that Southern University Law School is an identifiably black
school coexisting next to an identifiably white school. The decision to
attend L.S.U. Law Center or Southern University Law School would
be influenced by the location of the schools as well as admissions
requirements. Although the schools could continue to maintain different
admissions requirements and serve different educational functions, the
state would have fulfilled its duty to remedy any vestiges of past dis-
crimination. Unless the requirements for admission into Southern Uni-
versity Law School are raised and those at L.S.U. lowered, the racial
identifiability at L.S.U. Law Center may remain. However, in the absence
of state involvement, the court must recognize this potential development
as constitutionally permissible.
CONCLUSION
The limited number of qualified black law school applicants is
unfortunate because, among other things, it requires many schools to
compete for the few available students. The dearth of applicants may
be attributed to many factors, including the possibility of discrimination
or lack of educational opportunities in elementary and secondary public
schools. However, the proper place to begin eliminating the vestiges of
discrimination is not in higher education. In the absence of deliberate
exclusion of black applicants, the federal district court has no basis for
finding L.S.U. Law Center in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To hold otherwise would open the door to findings of constitutional
violations by all schools not possessing the prestigious reputations and
finances necessary to attract greater percentages of qualified minorities.
A merger of the two law schools is a devastating remedy for both
schools. L.S.U. Law Center will lose the prestige it presently enjoys as
a leading institution of legal training, while the desegregated Southern
University Law School will lose its identifiability as a school. Future
students will undoubtedly be harmed as the once stringent requirements
at L.S.U. Law Center are lowered, resulting in mediocrity. Black and
white students who could have met Southern University Law School's
admissions requirements but who cannot meet L.S.U.'s lowered admis-
sions requirements will be permanently precluded from obtaining a legal
education at all.
The district court has proposed a remedy that cannot survive either
previously stated level of scrutiny, as the merger and quota are not even
substantially related to serving important governmental objectives. The
state has fulfilled its duty under the Fourteenth Amendment by estab-
lishing neutral admissions policies at both law schools, and by estab-
lishing an affirmative action program at L.S.U. Law Center. Thus, the
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federal district court clearly has violated the requirement that the scope
of the remedy be limited to the severity of the violation. The district
court exceeded its equity jurisdiction in proposing this remedy, and
ironically, its proposed plan will not resolve the problems which it was
designed to correct. Hopefully, the district court order will not be upheld
upon review of the higher federal courts.
L. Tiffany Hawkins
